The final report on WMD requested by the President compares the Pre-War and Post-War conclusions of the CIA and Pentagon and finds the pre-war conclusions were “dead wrong.” It agrees with the report of the 1400-member Iraq Survey Group report from the CIA/Pentagon, and explains the mistakes. Findings:
- Biological weapons destroyed in 1991. No bio-weapon program since.
- No nuclear weapons programs. Capability to re-start degraded since 1991.
- Undeclared chemical weapons destroyed in 1991. None manufactured later.
- No intent to use unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver WMD.
- These findings prove the U.N. sanctions and inspections worked almost perfectly.
(March 31, 2005, www.wmd.gov/about.html)
From the letter of transmittal:
We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the NIE assessed that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program and could assemble a device by the end of the decade; that Iraq had biological weapons and mobile facilities for producing biological warfare (BW) agent; that Iraq had both renewed production of chemical weapons, and probably had chemical weapons stockpiles of up to 500 metric tons; and that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) probably intended to deliver BW agent.
These assessments were all wrong. (p.45)
The Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had not tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991. …it concluded that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute its program progressively decayed after 1991. (p.60)
Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW [biological warfare] weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent shortly after the Gulf War. … This took place in either the late spring or summer of 1991. (p. 86)
The ISG “found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.” (p. 87)
The ISG concluded—contrary to the Intelligence Community’s pre-war assessments—that Iraq had actually unilaterally destroyed its undeclared CW stockpile [of chemical weapons] in 1991 and that there were no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of CW thereafter (p.119)
The ISG found no evidence suggesting that Iraq had, at the time of the war, any intent to use UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] as BW or CW delivery systems. (p.141)
Notes: Brackets, [ ], indicate zFacts’ clarifications. Emphasis added.
NIE: the National Intelligence Estimate used by Congress to approve the war.
ISG: the “Iraq Survey Group” was a 1,400-member fact-finding mission organized by the Pentagon and CIA after the war to hunt for Saddam’s suspected WMD.
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
Report to the President of the United States
